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'Like someone sleep-walking or sleep-talking, I imitated the sounds and movements of others—an involuntary compulsive impressionist' (Williams 1994:3); and '...autism lets me speak my own words without knowing what I am saying or even thinking' (Williams 1994:233).

Other aspects of consciousness in ASD, such as bodily and perceptual self-awareness, have yet to be researched, despite a large number of anecdotal and autobiographical reports of, e.g., unusual sensory sensitivities and reduced pain responses. Awareness of own emotional states appears to be reduced in many individuals with ASD, at least according to self-report using questionnaire measures of so-called *alexithymia*. Other theoretical accounts of ASD, such as those focusing on enhanced processing of details, may have relevance for understanding self-awareness, but have yet to be developed in this direction.

Although it is never possible to know with certainty what another person's inner experience is like, it seems probable that people with autism and ASD may have a fundamentally different sense of self.

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automaticity The term *automatic* has been used in cognitive psychology to describe behaviour and the processes underlying behaviour. One question that automaticity researchers try to answer is how to diagnose whether a behaviour or process is automatic. Another question is how to explain the development toward automaticity (i.e. automatization). Both questions are discussed in turn. In the final section, I focus on the relation between automatic and unconscious as it is construed from the various views of automaticity discussed.

1. Diagnosis of automaticity
2. Explanation of automatization
3. Relation between automatic and unconscious

1. Diagnosis of automaticity

Usually, the diagnosis of a phenomenon is closely related to how it is defined. I therefore briefly consider some prominent views of automaticity here. Most theories of automaticity are feature-based, defining automaticity as an umbrella term for a number of features such as unintentional, uncontrolled, unconscious, efficient, and/or fast. The concept *non-automatic* covers the opposites of these features. Different feature-based theories vary with regard to the features they select as the crucial ones, as well as with regard to the degree of coherence they assume among features. Features have been clustered into two modes (dual-mode view), into three modes (triple-mode view), or have been considered to be entirely independent (e.g. decompositional view). Before discussing these views, I briefly consider definitions of the most recurring features in automaticity literature (see Moors and De Houwer 2006 for a detailed justification of these definitions).

Definitions of automaticity features. I start with a discussion of the features *controlled* and *intentional*. To say that a process is controlled implies that one has a goal regarding the process and that this goal actually causes the end state put forward in the goal. Processing goals can be of the promoting type (i.e. the goal to engage in the process) or of the counteracting type (e.g. the goals to alter, stop, or avoid the process). In the case of a promoting goal, the end state is the actual occurrence of a process. In the case of a counteracting goal, the end state is a change, the interruption, or the prevention of a process. To say that a process is uncontrolled can have different meanings. It can refer to the fact that one has a goal about the process but the desired effect is absent. It can also mean that the state of a process alters (i.e. that the process occurs, changes, is interrupted, is prevented) in the absence of the goal to achieve it. For instance, a process can be called *uncontrolled* in the sense that it is interrupted even when the person did not have the goal to interrupt it. A more subtle meaning of the term 'uncontrolled' refers to a situation in which both the goal and the desired effect are present, but the effect was not caused by the goal.