

Examining dispositional and situational effects on outgroup attitudes

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Abstract

Two research lines have dominated the quest for the antecedents of outgroup attitudes. Whereas the first has viewed outgroup attitudes as a result of individual differences, the second stressed the importance of the intergroup situation. In order to investigate the interplay of individual differences and situational characteristics, key predictors of the individual differences perspective (i.e., Right-Wing Authoritarianism or RWA, and Social Dominance Orientation or SDO) and the intergroup relations perspective (i.e., ingroup identification and ingroup threat) were simultaneously tested. Two studies revealed additive but no interaction effects of RWA and SDO, ingroup identification, and threat. Additionally, Study 1 showed that threat effects remain limited to the outgroup that is portrayed as threatening and do not generalize to other outgroups.

Life is littered with examples in which members of one group express implicit or explicit negative attitudes towards members of other groups. Although this can be innocent and even entertaining, this can also cause unbridgeable gaps between people. Because of this, issues of migration and how to improve intergroup attitudes and behaviors between different cultural communities within one country are becoming top priority on the political agenda of Western countries. In an attempt to contribute to this issue, psychologists have tried to gain insight into the genesis of negative outgroup attitudes. Two research lines have dominated this quest. The first regards negative outgroup attitudes as resulting from stable individual differences making people more or less prone to adopt such negative attitudes. The second views these attitudes as resulting from (perceived) characteristics of the intergroup situation. Although both perspectives shed light on the determinants of intergroup attitudes, both research lines have been developed relatively independently. The present study attempts to integrate key findings from both traditions in order to gain insight in the interplay of individual differences and characteristics of the intergroup context. Specifically, our study simultaneously assessed Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), and ingroup identification, and manipulated ingroup threat stemming from a specific outgroup. In addition to investigating threat effects, we also wanted to explore whether information about the enriching contribution of a specific outgroup to the ingroup would influence outgroup attitudes. Finally, we investigated whether threat and enrichment effects stemming from a specific outgroup generalize to attitudes towards other, similar outgroups.

The Individual Differences Perspective

Shortly after World War II, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) introduced "The Authoritarian Personality" to explain the rise of fascism from a psycho-dynamic perspective. Adorno et al. (1950) assumed that a childhood characterized by strict discipline, harsh punishment, and little warmth would produce a pathological personality structure that is characteristic of people who admire fascist ideologies. To assess this structure, which was thought to consist of nine covarying traits, Adorno et al. (1950) proposed the fascist potential scale (the F-scale). Disregarding the psycho-dynamic

basis of the authoritarianism construct and using a purely empirical approach instead, Altemeyer (1981, 1996) found that only three of the original facets were sufficiently internally consistent and correlated: Conventionalism (i.e., adherence to social norms), authoritarian submission (i.e., submissiveness to established authorities), and authoritarian aggression (i.e., willingness to aggress against persons or groups believed to be categorized as deviants by the established authorities). To measure this attitude cluster, Altemeyer developed the Right-Wing Authoritarianism or RWA scale, which was found to relate positively to negative attitudes and hostility toward several outgroups and is nowadays widely accepted as an important predictor of prejudice and discrimination. Based on social learning theory, Altemeyer (1998) assumes that RWA is acquired through social interactions (e.g., through teaching or modelling) and is open to lifelong development. However, at the same time, he considers adolescence to be a crucial formative phase, arguing that authoritarianism is fairly resistant to change later in life.

Although the motive for dominating other groups was part of the authoritarianism construct in the theorizing of Adorno et al. (1950), it was largely overlooked in subsequent decades as research focused on its submissive side (Altemeyer, 1988). In the 1990s, a renewed interest in the dominance motive appeared in the study of the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The concept of SDO refers to a preference for hierarchy versus equality in social systems. People scoring high on SDO are oriented to acquire and maintain high group status and dominance over other groups. RWA and SDO are often thought of as two sides of the same coin, with RWA providing submissive followers and SDO providing power-seeking leaders (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, & McBride, 2007), and studies have shown that, albeit moderately positively related, RWA and SDO additively predict outgroup attitudes (Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006). In addition, there is growing consensus that RWA and SDO have a different genesis. RWA would be rooted in social conformity (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), conservation values (Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005), conscientiousness (Duriez & Soenens, 2006) and a need for cognitive simplification (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). SDO would be rooted in tough-mindedness (Duckitt et al., 2002),

individualist and materialist values (Duriez et al., 2005; Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 2007), and disagreeableness and lack of empathy (Duriez & Soenens, 2006).

The Intergroup Relations Perspective

The idea that individual differences in outgroup attitudes would mainly result from psychological dispositions has been criticized because it leaves too little room for the role of situational characteristics. From an intergroup relations perspective, the importance of these characteristics is highlighted and the undeniable pressure that the context can impose upon an individual is emphasized. Within this perspective, two established theories (i.e., Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory) have stressed the effects of ingroup threat on outgroup attitudes (Brown, in preparation).

Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972) identified group interdependence as an important determinant of outgroup attitudes. In a series of field experiments, Sherif (1966) showed that the manipulation of group interdependence changed outgroup attitudes. When two groups were forced in a competitive situation (i.e., negative interdependence), outgroup attitudes tended to become more negative. More recent studies indicate that negative interdependence can be experienced even in the absence of actual competition, and that merely perceiving the intergroup situation as competitive is sufficient to develop negative outgroup attitudes (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998). In contrast, when two groups were forced in a situation characterized by the pursuit of common goals (i.e., positive interdependence), outgroup attitudes tended to become more positive.

Social Identity Theory acknowledges the importance of perceived competition over tangible resources, but stresses that this is not a necessary condition for outgroup attitudes to become negative (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The basic assumption is that people not only strive for a positive personal identity, but are also motivated to obtain a positive group identity. The value of a social identity would be assessed by comparing an ingroup with relevant outgroups on relevant comparison dimensions. If such comparisons turn out in favor of the ingroup, the ingroup is perceived as higher in status, resulting in a more positive social identity, and, hence, a more positive self-concept. However, if these comparisons

turn out in favor of the outgroup, ingroup bias mechanisms (i.e., ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup derogation) are likely to occur in order to maintain a positive self-concept. Whereas Realistic Group Conflict Theory highlights the importance of ingroup threat on a material level, Social Identity Theory stresses that group threat can also be perceived on a symbolic level, for instance, when group norms and values are questioned by an outgroup. Moreover, according to Social Identity Theory, the effects of threat can be expected to be moderated by ingroup identification: Because high identifiers attach more importance to their group identity, they will be more likely to adopt negative attitudes in order to restore a threatened positive group image. This would both be the case when ingroup threat occurs on a symbolic (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994) and a material level (e.g., Bizman & Yinon, 2001).

The idea of Realistic Group Conflict Theory that perceived competitiveness over resources is an important determinant of outgroup attitudes and the extension provided by Social Identity Theory that ingroup threat can also be perceived on a symbolic level were recently incorporated in Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). This theory predicts main effects of four types of threat on outgroup derogation: Realistic threat (or intergroup competition), symbolic threat, negative stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety. Most theoretical models of prejudice, however, consider negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety as essential components of prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Moreover, stereotypes and anxiety seem to result from situational characteristics rather than being such characteristics themselves. Therefore, in the present study, we limit our scope to the effects of realistic and symbolic threat.

Towards an Integrated Perspective

The individual differences and intergroup relations perspectives emphasize different determinants of outgroup attitudes. The individual differences perspective focuses on relatively stable psychological dispositions predicting negative outgroup attitudes, irrespective of the intergroup context. The intergroup relations approach focuses on characteristics of the intergroup situation that lead to negative outgroup attitudes, irrespective of specific characteristics of the involved individuals. Recently, theoretical

attempts have been made to integrate both perspectives in a so-called interaction perspective, which attempts to put a finger on the match between persons and situations that leads to the most negative outgroup attitudes. The primary aim of the present studies was to test these different perspectives. For this purpose, we combined important predictors proposed by the individual differences perspective and the intergroup relations perspective that may interact in a meaningful way. The main prediction from the individual differences perspective is that the more an individual subscribes to RWA and/or SDO, the more negative her/his attitudes will be towards outgroups in general. Irrespective of the intergroup context, people high on RWA should hold more negative outgroup attitudes than people low on RWA. Similarly, people high on SDO should hold more negative outgroup attitudes than people low on SDO. The intergroup relations perspective predicts that attitudes will be more negative when outgroups are perceived to threaten an ingroup with which one identifies. When an important ingroup is threatened, people would adopt more negative outgroup attitudes, even if they are low in RWA/SDO. From an interaction perspective, it can be expected that not everyone will react equally strong to situations in which an ingroup with which one identifies is being threatened.

Duckitt (2001) argued that people scoring high on RWA are more prone to develop negative attitudes towards an outgroup that threatens the norms, values and safety of their ingroup. People scoring high on RWA generally view the world as a dangerous place, and ingroup threat would activate this world view, which, in turn, would give rise to more negative outgroup attitudes. In this way, people high on RWA attempt to restore the image of the ingroup, because a positive social identity would compensate for their feelings of personal inadequacy and vulnerability. In addition, from a Social Identity Theory perspective, it can be expected that the degree to which people are sensitive to ingroup threat will depend on the degree to which they identify with this particular ingroup. Hence, based on the reasoning of both Duckitt and Social Identity Theory, a three-way interaction between RWA, perceived threat, and ingroup identification can be expected. Moreover, Duckitt (2001) argued that people scoring high on SDO are more prone to develop negative attitudes towards an outgroup that threatens the

wealth and status of their ingroup. People scoring high on SDO tend to view the world as a competitive jungle, and intergroup competition would activate this world view, which, in turn, would give rise to more negative outgroup attitudes. Again, when combining this reasoning with the reasoning that people who more strongly identify with a particular ingroup are more sensitive to ingroup threat, a three-way interaction between SDO, perceived threat, and ingroup identification can be expected.

Research attempting to integrate both perspectives has mainly focused on RWA. Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) found situation-specific activation of authoritarianism when people high on RWA identified with a group that is threatened by a specific outgroup. However, although this situation-specific RWA is assumed to cause negative outgroup attitudes, outgroup attitudes were not directly measured. Several other studies did investigate interactions between threat and RWA in the prediction of outgroup attitudes, without, however, taking variations in ingroup identification into account. Some, though not all, studies suggest that the relation between RWA and negative outgroup attitudes is indeed stronger in situations in which the ingroup is threatened. Using an indirect measure of RWA that was obtained by asking opinions about child-rearing, Feldman and Stenner (1997) showed that various forms of threat activate authoritarianism and that this interacts with perceived threat in the prediction of ethnocentrism. Similarly, Cohrs, Kiehlmann, Maes, and Moschner (2005) found a significant interaction between RWA and perceptions of threat in predicting German internet users' post-9/11 attitudes. However, Crowson, Debacker, and Thoma (2006) could not replicate this among US residents. In sum, evidence from studies on interactive effects of RWA and group threat is inconclusive. This might be due to the fact that differences in ingroup identification were not taken into account. Therefore, the present study aims to simultaneously examine the effects of RWA, ingroup identification, and ingroup threat.

Although no study ever tested the proposed three-way interaction between SDO, ingroup identification and ingroup threat, several studies investigated interactions between threat and SDO in predicting outgroup attitudes. For instance, Pratto and Shih (2000) showed that people high on SDO displayed more implicit outgroup derogation than people low on SDO, but only when ingroup status was

threatened. In contrast, Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong (1998) found additive instead of interactive effects of SDO and manipulated group competition on attitudes towards competing immigrants. Finally, in a correlational study predicting post-9/11 attitudes, Oswald (2005), could not confirm the interaction between SDO and perceived threat. In sum, similar to studies on RWA, studies examining the interplay of threat and SDO yield mixed findings. Inconsistencies could be due to the fact that, in different studies, different forms of threat (e.g., realistic threat, symbolic threat, terrorist threat, and mortality salience) were investigated. However, again, this might also be due to the fact that differences in ingroup identification were not taken into account. In support of this reasoning, evidence was found for an interaction between SDO and ingroup identification in predicting outgroup attitudes (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). Our study aims to address this shortcoming by simultaneously examining the effects of SDO, ingroup identification, and different forms of ingroup threat.

Present Study

The present study aims to simultaneously test main effects of RWA, SDO, and ingroup threat and possible interaction effects between RWA / SDO, threat, and ingroup identification. For this purpose, in Study 1, a between-subjects design was used in which perceptions of the intergroup context were manipulated after assessing RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification. Specifically, we manipulated perceptions of a new wave of Polish immigrants that was said to inevitably result from the recent inclusion of Poland into the European Union (EU). This topic was chosen because, at the time of our study, the possible consequences of the entry of Poland into the EU received a lot of media attention. This wave of new immigrants was either portrayed as a threat to the ingroup (= the threatening condition), in a neutral way (= the neutral condition), or as valuable to the ingroup (= the enrichment condition). In this way, results were not limited to the investigation of negative threat effects, but were broadened to incorporate possible positive effects of enrichment. In addition, we investigated whether the effects of threat stemming from a 'new' immigrant group on outgroup attitudes would be outgroup specific or would generalize to attitudes towards an 'old' immigrant group not mentioned in the

experimental manipulation. To test this additional hypothesis, attitudes towards Moroccan immigrants were assessed. This target group was chosen because Moroccan immigrants form a large and visible non-European immigrant group in Belgium (Perrin, 2007). Given that the intergroup relations perspective stresses the importance of the intergroup context, it seems plausible that situational effects of induced threat will be outgroup specific. In general, outgroup derogation is displayed to restore the positive self image that is damaged through the threat information. Because derogating another group does not serve this purpose, it is expected that the negative effects on outgroup attitudes will not spread out to groups that are not involved in the threat induction (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). Nevertheless, in Belgium, it was found that attitudes towards 'new' immigrants (e.g., Polish immigrants) are not differentiated from attitudes towards 'old' immigrants (e.g., Moroccans; Meuleman & Billiet, 2003). This effect might be explained by generalization at the level of the individual difference variables (Duckitt, 2006). Because people scoring high on RWA are motivated to defend social control, order, stability and cohesion, they will derogate groups that might threaten social conventions and traditions, including both Polish and Moroccan immigrant groups. Because people scoring high on SDO are motivated to defend their position in the power hierarchy, they will derogate groups that might question this hierarchy because of their lower social position, including both Polish and Moroccan immigrant groups.

STUDY 1

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were high-school students following an academic track who were recruited from schools in Flanders, the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, and who took part in the research during class hours ($N = 482$; 40% male; mean age = 16.52). All participants were of Belgian nationality and had Dutch as a mother tongue. Hence, all of them belonged to the high-status majority. Participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire assessing RWA, SDO, and Flemish ingroup identification. After having administered these measures, perceptions of ingroup threat were manipulated. The first group ($N = 161$;

40% male; Mean age = 16.53) received a vignette describing the negative consequences of the entrance of Poland into the EU and of the subsequent migration wave on the culture, economy and perceived safety of Flemish citizens. The second group ($N = 158$; 39% male; Mean age = 16.53), received a neutral report on Poland's application procedure for obtaining EU membership. The third group ($N = 163$; 40% male; Mean age = 16.52) received a vignette describing positive consequences of the entry of Poland and the subsequent migration wave on the culture, economics and safety of Flemish citizens. Participants were randomly assigned to the different conditions. The vignettes that were used can be found in the Appendix. Finally, prior to being debriefed, participants received a manipulation check and various measures tapping attitudes towards Polish and Moroccan immigrants.

Measures

All measures were administered in Dutch. Unless otherwise indicated, items were scored on 5-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

RWA and SDO. Participants completed a 14-item RWA scale (Duriez, Soenens, & Vansteenkiste, 2007; e.g., 'Obedience and respect for authority are among the most important virtues children should learn') and a 14-item SDO scale (Duriez, Soenens, et al., 2007; e.g., 'It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get ahead in life'). After reversing negatively worded items, Cronbach's alpha was .75 for RWA (Mean = 2.87; SD = 0.50), and .88 for SDO (Mean = 2.42; SD = 0.66). RWA and SDO were positively related ($r = .37, p < .001$).

Ingroup Identification. Participants completed a 6-item affective ingroup identification scale (Vanbeselaere, Meeus, & Boen, 2007), assessing the extent to which individuals self-identify with the Flemish ingroup (items are 'I feel like a real Fleming', 'I am proud to be Flemish', 'I feel connected with other Flemish people', 'I consider being Flemish as something important to me', 'There are many ways in which I resemble other Flemish people', and 'I consider myself to be typically Flemish'). Cronbach's alpha was .88 (Mean = 3.20; SD = 0.79). Ingroup identification was positively related to both RWA and SDO ($r = .42$ and $.31, p < .001$, respectively).

Manipulation Check. In order to check the effect of our scenarios, a 4-item manipulation check was administered. On a 9 point Likert scale ranging from *very threatening* (-4) over *neutral* (0) to *very enriching* (+4), participants indicated the degree of perceived threat caused by the admission of Poland to the European Union (EU) with respect to Flemish culture, Flemish economy, criminality in Flanders, and Flanders as a whole (e.g., 'I consider the effect of the entry of Poland into the European union to be...'). Cronbach's alpha was .84 (Mean = -0.12; SD = 1.23).

Negative Attitudes towards Polish Immigrants. Three indicators of outgroup attitude were chosen: Ingroup bias, discriminatory attitudes, and attitudes towards affirmative action. First, to assess affective bias, participants completed a 6-item scale tapping positive affect towards Flemish people (e.g., 'I admire the achievements of Flemish people'; Cronbach's alpha = .85; Mean = 3.76; SD = 0.57), and Polish immigrants (e.g., 'I admire the achievements of Polish immigrants'; Cronbach's alpha = .90; Mean = 3.24; SD = 0.71). From this, an ingroup bias measure was constructed by subtracting outgroup from ingroup affect (Cronbach's alpha = .90; Mean = 0.52; SD = 0.95). The higher the ingroup bias score, the more positively the ingroup is evaluated compared to outgroup. Second, as a more blatant form of prejudice, a 6-item discriminatory attitudes scale assessed the extent to which the ingroup should be advantaged over the outgroup (e.g., 'Flemish people have more right to subsidized housing facilities than Polish immigrants'; Cronbach's alpha = .91; Mean = 2.76; SD = 0.96). Finally, a 5-item scale assessed the extent to which participants supported affirmative action aimed at integrating Polish immigrants (e.g., 'I think programs should be started aimed at giving Polish immigrants better opportunities to find decent jobs'; Cronbach's alpha = .69; Mean = 2.83; SD = 0.61). The scree plot of a higher-order exploratory factor analysis on these highly correlated scales clearly pointed to a one-factor solution, and all three scales had high loadings on this factor (.86, .87, and -.85, respectively). Therefore, an overall negative attitudes towards Polish immigrants index (NAPI; Cronbach's alpha = .81) was computed by averaging standardized ingroup bias, discrimination, and reversely coded affirmative action scores.

Negative Attitudes towards Moroccan Immigrants. Participants completed a second set of items

tapping negative outgroup attitudes. This set of items only differed from the previous set with respect to target group (e.g., the item 'I admire the achievements of Polish immigrants' was reworded to 'I admire the achievements of Moroccan immigrants'). Cronbach's alpha's were .93 (Mean = 0.88; SD = 1.13), .93 (Mean = 2.78; SD = 1.03) and .73 (Mean = 2.76; SD = 0.68) for ingroup bias, discrimination, and affirmative action, respectively. Again, a scree plot clearly pointed to a one-factor solution. Because the scales had high loadings on the resulting factor (.88, .88 and -.86, respectively), the ingroup bias, discrimination, and reversely coded affirmative action scores were again averaged to form an overall negative attitudes towards Moroccan immigrants index (NAMI; Cronbach's alpha = .83).

Results

Preliminary Analyses

First, observations were screened for outliers using studentized residuals, leverage, and Cook's D statistics (see Ramsey & Schafer, 2002). However, no outliers were found. Second, the effect of our manipulations was checked. Univariate ANOVA-analyses indicated that the three conditions differed with respect to the way in which participants experienced the admission of Poland to the EU ($F(2, 481) = 52.64, p < .001$). Post-hoc Tukey comparisons of means showed that those who received the threatening scenario felt more threatened (Mean = -0.79, SD = 1.15) than those who received the neutral scenario (Mean = -0.05, SD = 0.92), who, in turn, felt more threatened than those who received the enrichment scenario (Mean = 0.48, SD = 1.25). Qualitative differences were also observed: One sample t-tests comparing the mean scores of each group with the zero midpoint of the scale revealed that participants interpreted the vignettes as intended. Specifically, the entrance of Poland was evaluated as threatening by people in the threatening condition ($t(160) = -8.70, p < .001$), as neutral in the neutral condition ($t(157) = -0.70, ns$), and as enriching in the enrichment condition ($t(162) = 4.89, p < .001$). Finally, because males have been found to score higher on SDO than females (e.g., Duriez, Vansteenkiste, et al., 2007), we checked whether gender affected the study variables. Univariate ANOVA-analyses indicated that boys had higher scores on SDO ($F(1, 480) = 19.88, p < .001$), NAPI (F

(1, 480) = 11.84, $p < .001$), and NAMI ($F(1, 480) = 9.92, p < .01$), and that boys reported more threat ($F(1, 480) = 6.95, p < .01$). Therefore, in all further analyses, gender was controlled for.

Primary Analyses

Main effects and interaction effects were tested by means of moderated multiple regression analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Interaction effects were specified by using the product terms of the standardized scores of their components. In order to test for interactions, product terms need to be partialled out for the effects of lower order components in stepwise regression (Aiken & West, 1991). This was done by entering gender in Step 1, the continuous predictor variables in Step 2, the two dummy variables representing the threat and the enrichment condition in Step 3, all two-way interactions in Step 4, and all three-way interactions in Step 5. The first dummy refers to the effect of threat, with the threatening condition coded 1 and the neutral and enrichment conditions coded 0. The second dummy refers to the effect of enrichment, with the enrichment condition coded 1 and the neutral and threat conditions coded 0. In this way, the effect of our manipulations can be compared with the baseline. To preclude trivial effects from becoming significant, an alpha-level of .01 was used. Multicollinearity considerations could be ruled out because all included components had tolerance scores greater than .10 and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores smaller than 10.

After controlling for gender in Step 1 ($R^2 = .03; F(1, 478) = 12.11, p < .001$), Step 2 ($\Delta R^2 = .44; F(3, 475) = 131.92, p < .001$) and Step 3 ($\Delta R^2 = .01; F(2, 473) = 4.71, p < .01$) added to the prediction of NAPI. Step 4 and Step 5 did not result in any significant increase in explained variance, indicating that none of the interactions contributed to the prediction of NAPI. Following the recommendations of Cohen and Cohen (1983), the significance of each interaction term was inspected separately in order to avoid testing too conservatively, but no meaningful interactions reached significance. In the final model, gender did not have a significant effect on NAPI, and NAPI was positively predicted by RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification ($\beta = .23, .32, \text{ and } .33, p < .001$, respectively). The threatening condition differed significantly from the control condition, but the enrichment condition did not. The effect of perceived

threat was in the expected direction ($\beta = .10, p < .01$) and the mean levels of NAPI were 2.09, in the neutral condition, 2.24 in the threatening condition, and 2.05 in the enrichment condition. We also investigated whether the effects of the manipulation extended to another immigrant group that has been residing in Belgium for a longer period of time (i.e., Moroccan immigrants). After controlling for gender in Step 1 ($R^2 = .02; F(1, 478) = 10.77, p < .01$), only RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification explained significant portions of the variance in NAMI ($\Delta R^2 = .46; F(3, 475) = 139.33, p < .001$). Step 3 revealed no effects of the threat manipulations. Again, the interactions in Step 4, and Step 5 did not add significantly to the prediction of the dependent variable. In the final model (Step 2), gender did not have a significant effect ($\beta = .06, ns$), and NAMI was uniquely predicted by RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification ($\beta = .27, .33, \text{ and } .30, p < .001$, respectively).

Discussion

Study 1 revealed additive main effects of RWA, SDO, ingroup identification, and threat. In line with the individual differences perspective, people high on RWA and SDO displayed more negative attitudes towards outgroups in general. In support of the intergroup relations perspective, experimentally induced group threat affected the attitudes towards the outgroup that was presented as the source of threat, even after taking individual differences in RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification into account. More precisely, although we did not find any positive effect of enrichment, a situation-specific negative effect of threat on the attitudes towards Polish immigrants was found. In contrast to Branscombe and Wann (1994), the main effect of threat was not moderated by ingroup identification. Apparently, it is not necessary to identify strongly with a group in order to be susceptible to group threat. Instead, a main effect of ingroup identification on attitudes towards both Polish and Moroccan immigrants indicated that, the more one identifies with the Flemish ingroup, the more negative the attitudes towards these immigrant groups. This finding is in line with previous studies in Flanders, suggesting an inherent exclusionist element in Flemish identification (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2008). In addition, and in line with both the intergroup relations perspective and the findings of Branscombe and Wann

(1994), the effect of threat was outgroup specific: Threat invoked negative attitudes towards the group that was the source of this threat but did not affect attitudes towards another, similar outgroup (i.e., Moroccan immigrants). Finally, Study 1 did not support the interaction hypothesis predicting interactions between RWA, ingroup identification and threat, and between SDO, ingroup identification and threat.

STUDY 2

In Study 2, a renewed attempt was made to find interaction effects. Given that Study 1 found neither enrichment nor generalization effects, Study 2 focused on the effects of perceived group threat stemming from a specific outgroup on attitudes towards this outgroup. Given that, for statistical reasons, finding strong and reliable effects for joint interactions is difficult due to the loss of statistical power that occurs when the order of the interactions increases (Chaplin, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983), the different perspectives were retested using a more sensitive and statistically more powerful within-subject design. In a between-subjects design, consistent differences related to the manipulation can remain unnoticed because of errors in the randomization process. A within-subject design compares differences between conditions within an individual, resulting in a reduction of error and an increase in statistical power. In addition, we increased the strength of our manipulation by inducing threat stemming from the entry of Turkey instead of Poland into the EU. The entry of Turkey into the EU was a hotly debated topic at the time of our study. The reason why this immigrant group might be more threatening is that Turkish immigrants are non-European and non-Christian and already form a large and visible immigrant group in Belgium (Perrin, 2007). Finally, as mentioned before it has been argued that, whereas people high on SDO would mainly feel threatened when outgroups are perceived as competitors in a struggle for resources (i.e., when realistic threat is perceived), people high on RWA would mainly feel threatened when established ingroup norms are challenged (i.e., when symbolic threat is perceived; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002). Therefore, our threat manipulation was fine-tuned to distinguish realistic from symbolic threat. Hence, we expect to find specific interactions between RWA, ingroup identification and symbolic threat, and between SDO, ingroup identification and realistic threat.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were Dutch-speaking humanity students of Belgian nationality belonging to the high-status majority ($N = 202$; 46% males; Mean age = 18.74). Data were gathered at three different measurement points, separated by two-week intervals. At Time 1, RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification were assessed, after which participants received a vignette in which information was given on the application of Turkey to become a member of the EU. At Time 2, participants received this short neutral vignette again. For half of them, this was followed by a vignette describing threat to the Flemish economy aroused by the entry of Turkey into the EU (=a realistic threat induction). For the other half, this was followed by a vignette describing threat to Flemish culture by the entry of Turkey into the EU (= a symbolic threat induction). At Time 3, after receiving the neutral vignettes, participants receiving the realistic threat induction at Time 2 received the symbolic threat induction, and vice versa. All vignettes can be found in the Appendix. Manipulations were followed by a manipulation check and an assessment of attitudes toward Turkish immigrants. In order to check for over-time changes in the degree to which people felt threatened by the potential admission of Turkey into the EU due to circumstances unrelated to our study, 89 additional Dutch-speaking humanity students of Belgian nationality belonging to the high-status majority with a similar age and gender distribution were assigned to a control group. At each measurement point, these participants received the neutral scenario followed by a manipulation check. At the end of the last session, all participants were debriefed.

Measures

All measures were administered in Dutch. Unless otherwise indicated, items were scored on 5-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Participants completed the same RWA scale (Cronbach's alpha = .76; Mean = 2.85; SD = 0.47), SDO scale (Cronbach's alpha = .88; Mean = 2.40; SD = 0.66), and Flemish identification scale (Cronbach's alpha = .89; Mean = 3.18; SD = 0.81) as in Study 1. RWA and SDO were strongly positively correlated ($r = .39$, $p < .001$) and

ingroup identification was positively correlated with both RWA ($r = .18, p < .01$) and SDO ($r = .09, p < .05$). To check manipulation effects, participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (7) whether they experienced symbolic threat (e.g., 'I fear that Flanders will lose its identity due to the admission of Turkey to the European Union') and/or realistic threat (e.g., 'I fear that this will force Flemish people and Turkish people to compete with one another'). At each measurement point, the scree plot of an explanatory factor analysis clearly pointed to two components. After Varimax rotations, the three items assessing symbolic threat loaded on the first factor and the three items assessing realistic threat loaded on the second. Hence, symbolic and realistic threat scores were computed by averaging the respective items. Cronbach's alphas ranged from .94 to .95 for symbolic threat and from .87 to .90 for realistic threat. To keep our questionnaire as brief as possible, outgroup attitude was measured with only one instead of three indicators. This was justified given the high correlations between the indicators in Study 1. Specifically, we used the scale with highest factor loading on the higher-order factor in Study 1 (i.e., the discrimination scale). At each measurement point, after receiving a vignette, participants completed a discrimination scale, differing only in reference group compared to Study 1 (e.g., the item 'Flemish people have more right on subsidized housing facilities than Polish immigrants' was reworded to 'Flemish people have more right on subsidized housing facilities than Turkish immigrants'). Cronbach alphas ranged from .89 to .92.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

As in Study 1, no outliers were found, and preliminary analyses were conducted on the control group to check for potential over-time changes in the degree to which people feel threatened by the entry of Turkey into the EU. GLM repeated measures analyses with time (i.e., Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3) and type of manipulation check (i.e., feelings of either realistic or symbolic threat) as within-subject factors revealed no significant effects of time ($F(2, 174) = .23, ns$) or of the interaction between time and type of manipulation check ($F(2, 174) = .59, ns$), suggesting the absence of over-time differences

in symbolic and realistic threat. In contrast, there was a main effect of type of manipulation check ($F(1, 87) = 76.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .47$), indicating that participants experienced more realistic (Mean = 2.96) than symbolic threat (Mean = 2.25) by the potential entry of Turkey into the EU.

The manipulation check was also used to check the effect of our scenarios. Repeated measures General Linear Model analyses with experimental condition (i.e., neutral, realistic threat, and symbolic threat) and type of manipulation check (i.e., feelings of realistic and symbolic threat) as within-subject factors revealed a significant interaction between these factors ($F(2, 402) = 7.98, p < .001, \eta^2 = .04$). In the realistic threat condition, although realistic threat was experienced to a greater extent (Mean = 3.46) than in the neutral condition (Mean = 2.94; $F(1, 201) = 39.35, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16$), symbolic threat was also experienced to a greater extent (Mean = 2.49) than in the neutral condition (Mean = 2.28; $F(1, 201) = 8.18, p < .01, \eta^2 = .04$). In the symbolic threat condition, although symbolic threat was experienced to a greater extent (Mean = 2.55) than in the neutral condition (Mean = 2.28; $F(1, 201) = 12.97, p < .001, \eta^2 = .06$), realistic threat was also experienced to a greater extent (Mean = 3.30) than in the neutral condition (Mean = 2.94; $F(1, 201) = 22.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$). These analyses suggest that realistic and symbolic threat could not be induced independently of each other.

Univariate ANOVA-analyses indicated that males obtained higher scores than females on SDO ($F(1, 200) = 25.67, p < .001$). No significant differences were found for RWA and ingroup identification. Neither the neutral condition nor the symbolic and realistic threat conditions revealed significant gender differences in either discrimination or experienced (symbolic or realistic) threat. Because of the gender differences in SDO, in all further analyses, we controlled for gender.

Primary Analyses

Effects on discrimination were analyzed with GLM mixed model analyses with the experimental manipulation (i.e., neutral, realistic threat, and symbolic threat condition) as within-subject factor and RWA, SDO, and identification (standardized scores) as between-subjects variables. Gender was included as a covariate. A full model including the main effects and all possible two-way, three-way and

four-way interactions was tested. As in Study 1, an alpha-level of .01 was used, and multicollinearity considerations could be ruled out because all included components had tolerance scores greater than .10 and VIF scores smaller than 10. Also as in Study 1, no significant interactions were found. In line with the main effect hypothesis, all between-subjects factors displayed a main effect: SDO ($F(1, 193) = 33.06, p < .001, \eta^2 = .15$), RWA ($F(1, 193) = 10.62, p = .001, \eta^2 = .05$), and identification ($F(1, 193) = 17.59, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$). Across the neutral, the realistic threat, and the symbolic threat condition, main effects were in the expected direction for SDO ($\beta = .36, .32, \text{ and } .33$, respectively), RWA ($\beta = .17, .21, \text{ and } .16$, respectively), and ingroup identification ($\beta = .21, .27, .20$, respectively). Moreover, we found a main effect of the within-subject factor threat ($F(1, 197) = 5.48, p = .005, \eta^2 = .03$). Specifically, simple contrasts indicated that discrimination scores were higher in the realistic (Mean = 2.83; $F(1, 193) = 6.49, p = .01, \eta^2 = .03$) and the symbolic threat condition (Mean = 2.86; $F(1, 193) = 9.41, p = .002, \eta^2 = .05$) than in the neutral condition (Mean = 2.72). Discrimination scores did not differ between the realistic and symbolic threat conditions. No significant gender effect was observed.

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the main effects of RWA, SDO, ingroup identification, and threat using a within-subject design with more relevant threat manipulations. Again, the effect of threat was not moderated by ingroup identification, a main effect of ingroup identification was observed, and no significant interactions between RWA or SDO, ingroup identification and threat were found. More specifically, Study 2 supported neither an interaction between RWA, ingroup identification and symbolic threat, nor between SDO, ingroup identification and realistic threat. This might be due to the fact that we were unable to differentially manipulate realistic and symbolic threat. Although factor analyses across the measurement point supported the discriminant validity of our threat measures, and although our realistic threat induction did not contain overt symbolic threat elements and vice versa, both threat inductions simultaneously increased feelings of realistic and symbolic threat. In sum, both inductions increased feelings of threat in general and had similar effects on outgroup discrimination.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present studies add to our insight in the interplay of some of the key determinants of negative outgroup attitudes that were proposed by the individual differences and the intergroup relations perspective. To our knowledge, this research is the first to combine individual differences in RWA and SDO, situationally induced threat, and ingroup identification to predict negative outgroup attitudes. In this way, it could be investigated how individual differences and situational variables can be integrated: Do they have additive or multiplicative effects on outgroup attitudes? Two studies with different target groups and a different design convincingly demonstrate additive instead of interactive effects of RWA/SDO, ingroup identification, and experimentally induced threat. In the remainder, we will discuss (1) the main effects RWA and SDO, (2) the main effects of ingroup identification and situationally induced threat, and (3) the implications of finding additive instead of interactive effects.

The Individual Differences Perspective

The individual differences perspective regards negative outgroup attitudes as resulting from stable individual differences making people more or less prone to adopting such attitudes. From this perspective, the importance of differences in RWA and SDO is well-documented. Both RWA and SDO were shown to be relatively independent predictors of negative outgroup attitudes (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2005; Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004). Accordingly, our studies revealed additive main effects of RWA and SDO on negative outgroup attitudes. Our findings are also in line with studies showing that people obtaining high scores on both RWA and SDO are more negative towards a variety of outgroups than people scoring high on only one of these factors (e.g., Altemeyer, 2004), and with a recent study showing that RWA and SDO have additive rather than interactive effects in predicting negative outgroup attitudes (Sibley, et al., 2006).

The Intergroup Relations Perspective

Predicting outgroup attitudes from stable individual differences in RWA and SDO has been criticized because it underestimates the role of situational determinants, such as the degree to which the

outgroup is experienced as threatening. In both of our studies, we found a main effect of induced group threat. This effect was not moderated by ingroup identification, but instead, a main effect of ingroup identification was consistently found. The main effect of threat is in line with Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Integrated Threat Theory. In contrast, the absence of moderation effects somewhat contradicts Social Identity Theory, which predicts that ingroup threat will have more effect among high identifiers (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). Apparently, being a member of the Flemish ingroup seems sufficient to be sensitive to ingroup threat. Maybe, this is because immigration influences all citizens whether they identify strongly or not. Finally, the observed main effect of Flemish identification indicates that the more one identifies with this group, the more negative one's attitudes will be towards outgroups in general. This finding is in line with previous research which found positive correlations between Flemish ingroup identification and negative outgroup attitudes (e.g., Meeus et al., 2008). Most probably, Flemish identity includes elements of ethnic exclusion (see Meeus et al., 2008).

In Study 1, two additional issues were addressed. First, we checked whether negative and positive situational cues would have equally strong effects on outgroup attitudes. For this purpose, respondents received vignettes in which the entrance of Poland into the EU and the subsequent immigration wave were described in a threatening, a neutral, or an enriching way. Outgroup attitudes were more negative in the threat condition than in the neutral condition. Yet, in spite of the fact that a manipulation check indicated that respondents were sensitive for enrichment arguments, outgroup attitudes were not more positive in the enrichment condition than in the neutral condition. This suggests that, whereas making people aware of possible negative consequences of immigration arouses negative outgroup attitudes, an inclusive or multiculturalist discourse does not induce more positive outgroup attitudes. The finding that negative information has more impact on attitude formation than positive information is in line with previous studies in the field of social cognition, reporting positive / negative asymmetry bias effects (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Second, we investigated whether the effect of threat induced by one outgroup would also lead to more negative attitudes towards other, similar

outgroups. Specifically, it was tested whether the effect of threat imposed by a 'new' immigrant group (i.e., Polish immigrants) would also increase negative attitudes towards 'old' immigrant groups (i.e., Moroccan immigrants). The threat effect turned out to be outgroup specific: Although attitudes towards Polish immigrants were more negative in the threat condition, attitudes towards Moroccans did not differ over conditions. This is in line with the findings of Branscombe and Wann (1994) who found that derogating other outgroups did not elevate collective self-esteem damaged by a specific outgroup.

Towards an Integrated Perspective

From an interaction perspective, three-way interactions between RWA, ingroup identification and (symbolic) threat, and between SDO, ingroup identification and (realistic) threat were expected. However, our findings do not support the assumption that only certain subgroups, namely those scoring high on RWA and SDO, would be sensitive to group threat and/or that threat would only impact upon people who identify strongly with an ingroup. The results of our study suggest that being a member of a group that is under threat always results in more negative outgroup attitudes, irrespective of individual characteristics of a given person and the importance this person attaches to the ingroup, and seem to imply that a discourse stressing ingroup threat, as provided by right-wing extremist parties or sensation seeking media, is more harmful than generally assumed, as it has the potential to affect the whole population rather than only those who already have a tendency to hold negative attitudes towards immigrants. The additive main effects of RWA, SDO, threat, and ingroup identification attest to the importance of both the individual differences and the intergroup relations perspectives: Combining both perspectives increases predictive power when it comes to explaining negative outgroup attitudes, and, hence, contributes to a more accurate understanding of when and why people react negatively to outgroups. At the same time, the absence of interaction effects suggests that both perspectives can independently contribute to explaining negative outgroup attitudes in a meaningful way.

Limitations and Future Directions

First, although our studies suggest that a discourse stressing ingroup threat, as provided by right-

wing extremist parties or sensation seeking media, has the potential to affect the whole population rather than merely those who already hold negative outgroup attitudes, future research might want to investigate the potential moderating role of the credibility of the source of information. In our studies, vignettes were presented by researchers affiliated to a respectable university which is not associated with stigmatizing outgroups. Hence, vignettes might have looked sufficiently neutral and credible to also affect people who might not have been affected by the same information if it had been provided by sources that are known to stigmatize certain immigrant groups. In fact, this might be one possible reason explaining our failure to find interaction effects. Another possible reason for the absence of significant interactions could be that outgroup attitudes were already strongly predicted by RWA, SDO, and ingroup identification. This could lead to two possible problems. First, a very powerful manipulation would be needed for interactions to emerge. Although our manipulation was effective, relatively small effect sizes indicate that the effects of our threat manipulation were limited. Second, even if the threat manipulations were strong enough, the absence of finding interactions could be due to ceiling effects on outgroup attitudes, making additional significant effects impossible. Moreover, because of prior exposure to threat information, it could be that people scoring high on RWA and/or SDO were already more influenced by prior exposure to threatening information than others. In this case the person-situation interactions are reflected in the strong main effects of these individual differences variables. Future research should check whether the same results would be obtained when working with outgroups that are not normally seen as threatening.

Second, whereas Study 2 focused on potential effects of two different forms of threat (i.e., symbolic and realistic), future studies might want to examine other forms of threat as well, such as safety threat. In daily life, immigrants are not only viewed as possible economic competitors or as people who threaten the norms and values of the host society, but also as potential criminals and terrorists. Although this aspect was included in the vignettes that were used in Study 1, future research might want to differentially manipulate this form of threat in order to test possible, specific interactions,

such as the possible interaction between a threat to physical safety and RWA. Such an interaction can be derived from Duckitt (2006), who has argued that, because RWA is rooted in a vision of the world as a dangerous place, people high on RWA are more reactive to this kind of threat inductions. However, it should be noted that differentially manipulating multiple forms of threats proves to be difficult. In Study 2, although factor analyses supported the discriminant validity of our threat measures, both threat inductions simultaneously increased feelings of realistic and symbolic threat. This might have been an artefact of our manipulations, but this is not very likely, given the fact that we paid explicit attention to make sure that our realistic threat induction did not contain symbolic threat elements and vice versa. In sum, it might well be that threat in one domain actually increases threat in other domains as well, and that it is impossible to differentially manipulate different forms of threat because any threat manipulation yields similar effects on outgroup attitudes. Future research might therefore want to investigate more thoroughly whether it is possible to differentially manipulate different forms of threat.

Third, the impact of majority group members' status within the ingroup could also be explored in future studies. It seems plausible that people with a low social position within the ingroup will be more sensitive to group threat than people with a high social position because threat to the ingroup might differentially affect the awareness of one's personal vulnerability. In this respect, it has been shown that differences in social status resulted in differences in SDO (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003). In the present study, however, social status was not measured. Given that participants were either university students or high school students following an academic track, all participants could be regarded as high in status, and differences in SDO were considered to reflect individual differences in the underlying disposition.

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Appendix

Study 1, Threat Scenario

On April 18th 1951 the first steps were taken for the unification of Europe. At that time six countries decided to join forces for trading in coal and steel. Since then the cooperation is no longer limited to coal and steel, but a broad common market has been established. The most important and most striking consequences in this respect are the introduction of the Euro and the opening of the European internal borders. Moreover, the European Union (EU) is answerable not only for economic, but also for political issues. Like the national governments, the different European governmental organs decide on such matters as traffic, environment, energy, education, culture... These institutions are awarded more and more power, and as a consequence, their influence on the inhabitants of the different member states is growing steadily. Therefore it is important for the EU to know to what extent the European population supports the followed course. Most of the time only adults are subjected to such opinion polls, but now the aim is to call upon the youth to speak. A topic that may be of great interest for them is the recent entry of Poland into the EU.

Critics point out that the entry of Poland into the EU is a delicate thing. As one of the major problems, they point to cultural differences with other member states. Poland is a bit of an outsider when it comes to history, cultural habits, and values. In addition, Poland would be very conservative, making it unlikely that it will attempt to adapt itself to the habits and traditions of other member states. Given that Poland is one of the biggest countries of the EU, it exerts lots of pressure on European rules and regulations, and, hence, causes trouble for the European policy of other member states. Because these rules and regulations apply to our country as well, Poland threatens the Flemish cultural identity.

Apart from cultural differences, advisors also point out economic problems related to the fact that there is free transport of money, goods and citizens within the EU. It can be expected that a lot of Polish citizens will migrate to more prosperous parts of Europe to work and live there. Flanders is among the popular destinations because of its high wages and its excellent social security system. Advisors fear

that this migration wave would destabilize the Flemish job market because it would cause a shortage of jobs and raise unemployment levels among Flemish citizens. Another consequence might be that this would make the current wages go down. Finally, it is not unlikely that a lot of companies would leave Flanders and move to Poland, attracted by the low wages and the beneficial tax policy out there. Together, these factors would put serious pressure on the Flemish economy.

Finally, advisors often also point out the risk of a serious rise in criminality in the other member states. Because of the high poverty rates, there is a lot of criminality in Poland. The free transport between European member states would enable Polish criminals to expand their activities across the whole of Europe. In this respect, the Belgian police notes that drug traffic from Poland can take on dramatic proportions. In addition, members of the Polish mafia are not exactly known to be sweethearts. The Polish history of war and poverty has made Polish criminality very tough and cruel. Polish robbers generally do not hesitate to kill people. The arrival of Polish immigrants might therefore not only increase criminality, but might also increase the more serious and cruel forms of criminality. Obviously, this would imply a serious threat to Flanders safety.

Study 1, Neutral Scenario

On April 18th 1951 the first steps were taken for the unification of Europe. At that time six countries decided to join forces for trading in coal and steel. Since then the cooperation is no longer limited to coal and steel, but a broad common market has been established. The most important and most striking consequences in this respect are the introduction of the Euro and the opening of the European internal borders. Moreover, the European Union (EU) is answerable not only for economic, but also for political issues. Like the national governments, the different European governmental organs decide on such matters as traffic, environment, energy, education, culture... These institutions are awarded more and more power, and as a consequence, their influence on the inhabitants of the different member states is growing steadily. Therefore it is important for the EU to know to what extent the European population supports the followed course. Most of the time only adults are subjected to

such opinion polls, but now the aim is to call upon the youth to speak. A topic that may be of great interest for them is the recent entry of Poland into the EU.

Besides an expansion of competences, the EU has also experienced an expansion of the number of participating countries. Nowadays, the EU has 25 member states. In order to join, candidate member states have to follow a plan consisting of different stages. First a candidate member state has to submit a request with the European Council. Subsequently an inquiry is made to check if the country complies with the conditions of membership. If the European Council submits a positive report and the European Commission agrees unanimously with this, the official negotiations between the candidate member state and the present member states can start. During these negotiations the European legislation is checked chapter by chapter to see if an agreement can be reached. This process of joining is ended when the European Council, the European Parliament and all individual member states give the green light.

Poland too has gone through this process of joining. In 1999 the request for joining was accepted and negotiations have started. Poland has had to push through changes in different fields to be able to comply with the European instructions. Through a large referendum the Polish citizens were also asked if they themselves agreed with the changes. On January 1st 2004 all steps were taken and Poland was acclaimed as an official member state of the EU.

Study 1, Enrichment Scenario

On April 18th 1951 the first steps were taken for the unification of Europe. At that time six countries decided to join forces for trading in coal and steel. Since then the cooperation is no longer limited to coal and steel, but a broad common market has been established. The most important and most striking consequences in this respect are the introduction of the Euro and the opening of the European internal borders. Moreover, the European Union (EU) is answerable not only for economic, but also for political issues. Like the national governments, the different European governmental organs decide on such matters as traffic, environment, energy, education, culture... These institutions are awarded more and more power, and as a consequence, their influence on the inhabitants of the

different member states is growing steadily. Therefore it is important for the EU to know to what extent the European population supports the followed course. Most of the time only adults are subjected to such opinion polls, but now the aim is to call upon the youth to speak. A topic that may be of great interest for them is the recent entry of Poland into the EU.

According to experts, the entry of Poland into the EU is already a success. Poland appeared to be well prepared for its entry into the EU, and has made all necessary internal adjustments to bring itself in line with the mentality, habits, and traditions of the other member states. In addition, Poland can make a valuable contribution to the EU because of the emphasis it puts on values like solidarity and social engagement and involvement. These values, which were undeservedly downplayed in the other member states, can now be expected to receive more attention in the future. For Flanders, this is very desirable, as solidarity and communal life used to be the corner stone of the Flemish culture. In short, the entry of Poland into the EU would lead Flanders to regain its traditional identity.

Apart from this, the entry of Poland into the EU also yields several economic advantages. One of the biggest advantages is that this opens up the borders between Poland and Belgium for free trade. Economics expect that all EU member states will know a boost to the economic progress because Poland adds 38 million people to the European consumer market. Of course, this is also a good thing for Flemish export and employment. In addition, the movement of workers can solve the problem of an ageing population. Within a couple of years, Flanders will be faced with the problem that there are no longer enough workers to guarantee the pensions of the elderly, a subgroup of the population that is continually enlarging. The arrival of young Polish workers would largely solve this problem. Moreover, because Polish immigrants would mainly be employed in jobs that are not very popular amongst the Flemish, Polish immigrants and Flemish citizens would hardly have to compete for jobs at all. Rather, they would help us to ensure our economic prosperity and competitive power.

Finally, experts point out that the entry of Poland into the EU would result in diminished criminality in the current member states. In the past, Flanders used to fall victim to illegal Polish

immigrants who threatened safety with drug traffic and armed robbery. However, Polish EU membership allowed Flanders and Poland to collaborate in combating international crime. As a result of this improved collaboration, there has already been a severe decrease in drugs and arms traffic. In addition, this improved collaboration resulted in a series of important successes in the battle against the Polish mafia which encapsulated itself in Brussels. In short, the entry of Poland into the EU seems to have augmented the stability within the European continent, and seems to increase Belgian national security.

Study 2, Neutral Scenario

On April 18th 1951 the first steps were taken for the unification of Europe. At that time six countries decided to join forces for trading in coal and steel. Cooperation is no longer limited to coal and steel, but a broad common market has been established. The most important and most striking consequences in this respect are the introduction of the Euro and the opening of the European internal borders. Moreover, the European Union (EU) is answerable not only for economic, but also for political issues. Like the national governments, the different European governmental organs decide on such matters as traffic, environment, energy, education, culture... These institutions are awarded more and more power, and as a consequence, their influence on the inhabitants of the different member states is growing steadily. Because it is important to know to what extent its citizens agree with the chosen path, universities all over Europe were asked to organize polls. In this respect, we chose to focus on a topic that has direct relevance for Flemish citizens: The entry of Turkey into the EU.

Besides an expansion of competences, the EU has also experienced an expansion of the number of participating countries. Nowadays, the EU has 25 member states. In order to join, candidate member states have to follow a plan consisting of different stages. First a candidate member state has to submit a request with the European Council. Subsequently an inquiry is made to check if the country complies with the conditions of membership. If the European Council submits a positive report and the European Commission agrees unanimously with this, the official negotiations between the candidate member state

and the present member states can start. During these negotiations the European legislation is checked in detail to see if an agreement can be reached. This process of joining is ended when the European Council, the European Parliament and all individual member states give the green light. The latest development in the extension of the EU concerns the potential entry of Turkey. On the 3rd of October 2005, the potential admission of Turkey was agreed upon, and the final negotiations were started.

Study 2, Realistic Threat Addition

In spite of this procedure, the final negotiations turn out to be difficult and delicate. The potential entry of Turkey has stirred furious debates both in the European Parliament and the press. One of the most important problems appears to be the difference in the cost of living between Turkey and the other European member states. Turkey would not only become the biggest but also the poorest European country. The Turkish Gross National Product (GNP) equals only 30% of the European average, and the average Turkish income equals only 62% of the average Polish income and only 12% of the income of inhabitants of the older member states. Analyses point out that the only thing that can change this would be a gigantic money transfer from the older member states to Turkey. This would boil down to a drastic down-sizing of the welfare of the average Belgian citizen.

In addition, it is expected that an entry of Turkey into the EU would be accompanied by an enormous migration wave. Because of the huge differences in cost of living, it is estimated that about 2.5 million Turks would make use of the opening of the Turkish borders to emigrate. Popular destinations would probably be Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium because these countries already host large Turkish communities. The massive immigration of cheap work forces would constitute a realistic threat to the stability of the Belgian labor market: Unemployment would rise, and, as a consequence of the greater supply of workers, wages would go down. Worst case scenario would be that the current, already fragile social security system would collapse. But the opening of the Turkish-European borders might have another devastating effect as well: It would become very attractive for various companies to migrate to Turkey. Economists converge on the opinion that the call of cheap

properties, low wages and low taxes would be even louder than the call of low wages and taxes in the recently included Eastern European countries. In addition, on average, Turks would be considerably higher educated than Eastern Europeans. Therefore, the entry of Turkey into the EU would also have serious consequences for the higher educated, something which was not the case with former extensions of the EU.

Study 2, Symbolic Threat Addition

In spite of this procedure, final negotiations turn out to be extremely difficult, and the potential entry of Turkey has stirred furious debates in the European Parliament and the press. One of the most important problems appears to be the cultural difference between Turkey and the other member states. The fact that Turkey is an Islamic country is cumbersome to plenty of critics. For the time being, Europe consists of Christian oriented countries only, making Turkey not only exceptional with respect to religion, but also with respect to history, cultural habits, and value system. In addition, Turkey is severely lagging behind other member states when it comes to democracy and human rights. In a recent report, the human rights organization Human Rights Watch mentions hundreds of cases of torture in Turkish prisons, and according to Amnesty International, medical care for prisoners is a disaster.

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